Search results for "Repeated games"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Adaptation, coordination, and local interactions via distributed approachability
2017
This paper investigates the relation between cooperation, competition, and local interactions in large distributed multi-agent\ud systems. The main contribution is the game-theoretic problem formulation and solution approach based on the new framework\ud of distributed approachability, and the study of the convergence properties of the resulting game model. Approachability\ud theory is the theory of two-player repeated games with vector payoffs, and distributed approachability is here presented for\ud the first time as an extension to the case where we have a team of agents cooperating against a team of adversaries under local\ud information and interaction structure. The game model turns i…
Codification schemes and finite automata
2000
This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds of Neyman¿s (1998) work on finitely repeated games played by finite automata.
REPEATED GAMES WITH PROBABILISTIC HORIZON
2005
Repeated games with probabilistic horizon are defined as those games where players have a common probability structure over the length of the game's repetition, T. In particular, for each t, they assign a probability pt to the event that "the game ends in period t". In this framework we analyze Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma games in both finite stage and differentiable stage games. Our construction shows that it is possible to reach cooperative equilibria under some conditions on the distribution of the discrete random variable T even if the expected length of the game is finite. More precisely, we completely characterize the existence of sub-game perfect cooperative equilibria in finite s…
A formal model based on Game Theory for the analysis of cooperation in distributed service discovery
2016
New systems can be designed, developed, and managed as societies of agents that interact with each other by offering and providing services. These systems can be viewed as complex networks where nodes are bounded rational agents. In order to deal with complex goals, they require cooperation of the other agents to be able to locate the required services. The aim of this paper is formally and empirically analyze under which circumstances cooperation emerges in decentralized search of services. We propose a repeated game model that formalizes the interactions among agents in a search process where agents are free to choose between cooperate or not in the process. Agents make decisions based on…
Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium
2010
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the cost of memory goes to 0, includes the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. This result stands in sharp contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), who proved that when memory is free, the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played by players with bounded computational power is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded c…